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I. THE CONCEPT OF EFFECTIVE PROTECTION
1. The establishment of the Common Marketj a more inward looking trade
policy on the part of the United States and, last but not least, the
urgent demand of less developed countries for free access to the mar-
kets of the highly industrialized nations have revived international
interest in the impact of foreign trade regulations on a country s
domestic industry. One of the major points of interest is to analyse
how trade regulations influence the comparative costs of domestic in-
dustries and consequently the structural pattern of industry. Pro-
tective measures such as tariffss import quotas, subsidies and taxes
alter a given industrial pattern by providing some industries with an
advantages, while the economic conditions of others remain unchanged or
even worsen. In the course of international trade liberalisation,
reductions of trade barriers will create a need for adjustment proces-
ses in almost all economic activities. Effective rates of protection
may help to achieve a better and smooth adjustment by providing infor-
mation on the impact of trade regulations on gross production.
U. Hiemenz is research fellow at the Kiel Institute of World Economics
and K.v. Rabenau is assistant professor at the University of Regensburg.2. In a world with intermediate and final goods the impact of a tariff
system on production activities is twofold: on the one hand a tariff
imposed on competing imports makes possible a similar increase in
the price of the respective domestic commodity; but on the other hand
the prices of the inputs necessary to produce that commodity may have
risen as a result of tariffs also. Thus a tariff on a final product
can be compared to a subsidy on the domestic activity, whereas tariffs
on raw materials and intermediate products are similar to indirect
taxes. These two controversial effects must be balanced in order to
estimate the real degree of protection which an industry obtains from
tariffs. The concept of effective protection provides a methodology
for such calculations which is based on domestic value added. Effec-
tive rates of protection show to what extent the different industries
can increase, or have to reduce, their production costs under the
tariff system, as compared to a free trade situation.
3. Because effective rates of protection measure the changes of industrial
2)
value added which have been induced by the national trade policy
only these rates provide information on the structural impact of trade
regulations. The higher the effective rate of protection for one
activity in relation to other industries, the greater the chance for
the more heavily protected sector to accumulate more capital and/or
Given an infinitely elastic supply curve for imports.
The effects of trade regulations other than tariffs will be dis-
cussed in Section VI.labour, as compared to a free trade situations and to increase output.
Therefore the structural pattern of industry is distorted in favour
of the more highly protected sectors and the factors of production are
not allocated according to the laws of productivity. If policy makers
know the amounts and structure of the effective rates of protection,
they are able to induce a factor-migration between different occupa-
tions by means of trade policy. The reduction of an industry's effec-
tive protection, for example, results in a decrease of its value
added. Firms at the margin (that is, firms with a relatively high
level of production costs) will have to close down because they are
no longer able to cover their variable costs or because profits fall
below the minimum rate of long-term profitability. Thus capital and
labour would move to other occupations. The precise volume of migra-
tion, however, cannot be estimated because it depends heavily on the
structure of production costs of firms in the branch under considera-
tion.
II. METHODS
4. Having shed some light on the conceptual background of our analysis,
we now turn to the measurement of effective protection. For concep-
tual and methodological reasons calculations have been carried out in
two distinct steps. First, effective rates of protection were estimated
merely on the basis of ad valorem and specific tariffs (the so-called
effective tariff rate). The protection effects of all trade regula-tions taken together - as far as data availability allowed us to
include them - result from a second calculation. This procedure has
the advantage of showing separately to what extent the currently most
important trade regulation, that is, tariffs, influences the struc-
tural picture of West German industries and to what extent the struc-
ture of tariff protection is altered by additional trade regulations.
In addition, separate calculations were preferred because of the dif-
fering availability of data. While there is a complete schedule of
tariffs, the difficulties in collecting information on nontariff dis-
tortions are tremendous and sometimes insurmountable.
^. To calculate effective tariff rates for the different branches of West
German industry, a somewhat complicated-looking formula has been
3)
developed from the general theory of effective protection. Basical-
ly effective rates of protection are derived from a neo-classical
4) model of an open economy with linear homogeneous production functions
and internationally traded goods. The initial formulation of the
basic concept goes back to the pioneering theoretical contributions of
Max Corden. According to this concept the effective protection of a
A simple introduction to the theory of effective protection is given
in H.G. Grubel, "Effective Tariff Protection, A Non-specialist Guide
to the Theory, Policy Implications and Controversies ', in H.G. Grubel
and H.G. Johnson (eds.), Effective Tariff Protection (Geneva, 1971),
pp. 1-15. A more rigorous treatment of the subject may be obtained
from W.M. Corden, The Theory of Protection (Oxford, 1971).
4)
Because of this assumption calculations on the basis of value added
per unit of output are equivalent to calculations based on total value
added.
'W.M. Corden, "The Tariff", in A. Hunter (ed.). The Economics of
Australian Industry, Studies in Environment and Structure (Melbourne,
1963), pp. 174 sqq. - W.M. Corden, "The Structure of a Tariff System
and the Effective Protective Rate", The Journal of Political Economy,












production activity j is defined as the per cent increase of domestic
value added V. (domestic production costs) above value added measured
in world market prices V.' (that is, cif-import prices). Using input-
output terminology, this rate, E.s may be written as:
j = 1, . . . , n
i = 1, . . . , m
where the a.. represent the value input coefficients of the inputs i
in the production of the product j, while t. and t. indicate the
nominal tariffs on j and i respectively.
6. The empirical applicability and prediction power of the above formula
depend on a number of assumptions whose relevance has been heavily
discussed in the economic literature. By extending the concept with
respect to nontariff distortions, non-traded inputs, depreciations and
a distinction between domestically sold and exported goods, it was pos-
sible to narrow the gap between theory and reality. Yet, as Wilfred
Ethi^r's excellent contribution proves, two basic assumptions are
necessary if effective rates are to show the distortions of gross pro-
duction caused by protection. First, physical input coefficients of
intermediate goods must not be influenced by the protective system or
its changes; and second, the protective measures must be neither pro-
hibitive nor redundant.
W.J. Ethier, "General Equilibrium Theory and the Concept of the
Effective Rate of Protection'
1, in Effective Tariff Protection, op.
cit.„ pp. 17 sqq.7. The assumption of constant input coefficients means that the impact
of protective measures on input prices must lead neither to substitu-
tion processes between intermediate and primary inputs (labour and
capital) nor to substitution between the intermediate inputs. The
first outcome is very unlikely to occur, because in general physical
parts of a product cannot be replaced by additional labour or capital
inputs or vice versa. Whether or not a substitution between the
intermediate inputs takes place depends on the technical composition of
the product. Given a possibility for alternative compositions, tariff
changes will have to induce remarkable distortions in price relations
to produce substitution processes. Entrepreneurs will prefer one
input against another only if current input costs can be reduced sub-
stantially so that the extraordinary costs associated with the change
of the production process become relatively insignificant. Since the
average tariff level of West Germany on raw materials and intermediate
products is comparatively low, it is reasonable to assume that tariffs
have not produced significant substitution incentives. This argument
is supported by empirical evidence showing an at least medium term
independence of physical input coefficients from price changes.
'?8', The second assumption means that domestic prices differ from cif-
import prices only by the tariff. In general this is an empirical
See B. Cameron, ''The Production Function in Leontief Models", The
Review of Economic Studies, 1952/53 (Vol. 20), pp. 62 sqq. - K.J.
Arrow and M. Hoffenburg, A Time Series Analysis of Interindustry
Demand (Amsterdam, 1959). - M. Hatanaka, The Workability of Input-
Output Analysis (Ludwigshafen, 1960). - C.B. Tilanus, Input-Output
Experiments. The Netherlands 1948-1961, Rotterdam Dissertation,
19659 pp. 42 sqq.rather than a theoretical question. Besides the possibility of pro-
hibitive or redundant tariffs, price differences are a matter of dif-
ferences in quality, of the degree of competition and of transporta-
tion costs. The latter are negligible, at least in the case of West
Germany, since transportation costs of the domestic producers and of
the importers will hardly deviate from one another on an average.
Concerning prohibitive or redundant tariffs, we tried a regression
analysis to identify the branches for which nominal tariff rates might
not be an appropriate deflator to estimate free trade values. Unfor-
tunately we failed in this attempt because data availability and level
of aggregation were insufficient to give evidence for single branches.
But since import shares in West German consumption are generally rather
significant (Table 6), prohibitive or redundant tariffs will not dis-
tort our results. Nevertheless we feel that in West Germany interna-
tional competition rules out significant quality differences and there-
by significant price differences. Furthermore the relevance of this
problem is diminished since our calculations are based on product groups
8) instead of single, not completely homogeneous goods. To find out how
much prohibitive or redundant tariffs might change the structure of
effective rates of protection a further detailed analysis - branch by
branch - would be needed.
To compute effective tariff rates we extended the above formula with
respect to further influences on the degree of protection. First we
decided to regard depreciation as capital input which diminishes value
Some studies prove that this assumption is not far-fetched, empiric-
ally. For West Germany, see for instance, G. Fels, Per international
Preiszusammenhang - Eine Studie iiber den Inflationsimport in der BRD
(Koln, Berlin, Bonn, Mannheim, 1969).added. This procedure allowed us to include the discrimination
against some industries resulting from tariffs on investment goods.
Since the components which add up to total depreciations of an indus-
try are not known, we used the following approximation. The total de-
preciation coefficient A. (depreciation divided by gross production)
of an industry j was decomposed according to the current gross invest
ment composition. The value component (y •) of an investment good x
in gross investment is assumed to equal its component in total depre-
ciations. Thus we get;
j = 1, . . . , n
E. = -. 1 i = 1, . . . , m
j aAy
x = 1, .... m
10. A problem arising from the necessary aggregation of input-output
tables consists of the aggregation of domestic and export sales of the
different branches. Since tariffs protect only domestic sales, export
sales have to be separated for a correct calculation of effective
9)
tariffs. Therefore only domestic sales were deflated with the ag-
gregate nominal tariff, while the export turnover was left unchanged:
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See J.C. Leith, "Substitution and Supply Elasticities in Calculating
the Effective Protective Rate
11, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 196S
(Vol. 82), pp. 588 sqq.11. The basic concept rests on the assumption that all goods are interna-
tionally traded. But there are quite a number of goods for which an
international equalisation of prices certainly does not work (as
services for example). Therefore the price of these products is not
influenced by a tariff system directly but indirectly by nominal
tariffs on traded inputs which are used to produce non-traded inputs.
The treatment of the non-traded input largely depends on the theo-
retical understanding of the problem. Despite Corden's arguments
we chose the Balassa method for its ease of interpretation.
Corden's calculations are based on value added of traded goods and
non-traded goods taken together, thus initiating a confusion concerning
the impact of effective protection on gross production of single indus-
tries. The Balassa method„ on the other hand, is based only on the
value added of the industry under consideration. The value added of
non-traded inputs is assumed to be constant and unaffected by the
tariff system. To estimate the free trade value added of the branch
under consideration the coefficients of non-traded inputs (a, .) are
broken down into their shares of value added (f .), traded inputs (a-,)
irk. XK.
and non-traded inputs (a , ), and only the traded inputs a.^ are
nuc lie
deflated with the corresponding tariffs t. Adding this to our for-
mula we get;
Corden, The Structure, op. cit., p. 226 sqq.
B. Balassa et al., The Structure of Protection in Developing Coun-
tries (Baltimore and London, 1971), pp. 17 sqq and pp. 321 sqq.10
1-A. - Z a. . - Z a, .
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The impact of tariffs on the prices of non-traded inputs is estimated
more accurately the more often this decomposition is carried out. But
because the increase of accuracy diminishes very quickly9 we con-
sidered only the last two production levels of non-traded inputs.
Thus emerges our final formula for the calculation of effective rates
of tariff protection:
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Symbols
E. Effective tariff rate of industry j
A. Depreciation coefficient of industry j
y . Fraction of the investment-good x of the total investment of industry j for the year under consideration
a.. Input coefficient of traded inputs i, which are used in industry j
a. . Input coefficient of non-traded inputs k, which are used in industry j
KJ
$ , Input coefficient of the primary factors r necessary to produce the non-traded inputs k
a.. Input coefficient of traded inputs i necessary to produce the non-traded inputs k
a , Input coefficient of the non-traded inputs m necessary to produce the non-traded inputs k
B Input coefficient of the primary factors r necessary to produce the non-traded inputs m
a. Input coefficient of traded inputs i necessary to produce the non-traded inputs m
a Input coefficient of non-traded inputs w necessary to produce the non-traded inputs m d. Domestic turnover of industry j as fraction of j's total turnover
t. Nominal rate of tariff protection of industry j
cx Tariff rate of investment-good x
t. Tariff rate of the traded inputs i .
l ,12
III. DATA
12. Effective tariff rates as well as effective rates of protection have
been calculated for different years to measure not only the current
distortion of the structural pattern of industry in comparison to a
free trade situation, but also the changes in the distortion arising
from changes in the tariff structure. To account for the European
economic integration starting in 1959 and the subsequent trade agree-
ments of the Kennedy Round (1963-1967), the years 1958-1972 were
chosen as the period under observation. But as the compilation and
preparation of data were rather difficult and extremely time-consumings
effective rates have been calculated only
- for 1958, the year prior to the establishment of the EEC,
- for 1964, when the harmonisation of the external tariffs had been
completed in all EEC countries,
- for 1970, when all internal tariffs within the EEC had been
abolished, and
- for 1972, the last year of tariff reductions resulting from the
Kennedy Round (only tariff protection).
In 1956 and 1964 there was a multiple West German tariff scheme for
items covered by the agreements of the European Coal and Steel Commu-
nity in 1958, and in 1964, for all trade with EEC countries. There-
fore the effective protection against suppliers within the EEC and
against non-EEC suppliers was calculated separately. Since in 1970
and 1972 the tariff protection of German producers against EEC com-
petitors had been removed, the protection against imports from non-EEC12)
countries for these years was estimated alone. Unfortunately we
could not include in our calculations the special regulations for
associates of the EEC and the tariff reductions for certain imports
from developing countries, which came into operation on July 1, 1973.
But as a short analysis of these regulations will show (Section V) our
results are not affected by this omission.
13. The basic data for our computations were drawn from the official
German and EEC tariff schedules ' which provide nominal tariff
rates in the four-digit "Brusseles-Tariff-Nomenclature" (BTN) with its
sub-divisions. These approximately 5,000 tariff rates were attached
to the respective items of the applied input-output matrix by
12)
Since the Common External Tariff is the same for all member coun-
tries, the reader might feel inclined to extend the applicability
of the German effective rates of protection against non-EEC sup-
pliers to any EEC country. It has to be stressed, however, that
the results depend heavily on the underlying production structure.
Only if the applied technology and the product mix do not differ
significantly from one country to another, may effective rates of
one country reflect the protection of another country's producers
as well. Although we did not make inquiries into this subject,
there is some evidence for a similarity of production structures
between the member countries, which could justify an extended ap-
plication of our results. Nevertheless we prefer to restrict our
analysis to West Germany.
1 TJ
'Deutscher Zolltariff 1958, Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I, Jg. 1957, Nr.
53; Deutscher Zolltariff 1965, Anlageband zum Bundesgesetzblatt
Teil II, Jg. 1964 and Bundesgesetzblatt Teil II, Jg. 1969, Nr. 91.
^Amtsblatt der Europaischen Gemeinschaft, 13. Jgg. (1970) Nr. LI and
15 Jgg. (1972), Nr. LI.14
transforming them into the classification of this matrix which is
almost equal to the official German "Commodity Classification for
Industry Statistics." The data concerning the production structure
were computed on the basis of the most highly disaggregated input-
output tables for the West German industry, which were made available
by the Ifo Institute for Economic Research, Munich, for 1961-1964.
Although these tables show the input structure of only 39 manufactur-
ing sectors, they have the advantage that the inputs are disaggregated
into about 5,000 items, thus allowing for a very precise computation
of free trade input coefficients. Furthermore these tables are con-
structed according to the principle that only similar production ac-
tivities should be put together in one sectors that is, the different
industrial sectors are not defined on the basis of companies or firms
but on the basis of goods. Therefore our results refer to certain
goodss which is the required information, and not to firms.
14. The computation of effective tariff rates for 1958 is based on the
input-output matrix for 1961; the 1964 table was used for all other
In fact, a double transformation was necessary. First we trans-
formed the tariff rates from the four-digit BTN into the German six-
digit 'Commodity Classification for Foreign Trade.' Then we were
able to make use of a transformation matrix provided by the Ifo-
Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung, Munich, to translate the rates
from the foreign trade classification into the classification of
the applied input-output matrix.
G. Gehrig et al., Ergebnisse der Input-Output Rechnung 1961-1964
(Ifo-Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung, Munich3 Input~Output~
Studien, Vol. 6-9).15
years under observation. Since no updated input-output tables with
the same internal structure are available, this procedure was inevit-
able. Sensitivity tests have proved, however, that changes of the
production structure, occurring within the time span under considera-
tion, are negligible insofar as they do not distort our results.
IV. THE EFFECTIVE TARIFF PROTECTION OF WEST GERMAN INDUSTRY
•1'5\ The nominal tariff rates and the effective tariff rates for thirty-
19) seven branches of West German industry are shown in Tables 1-4 and
are illustrated in Graphs 1 and 2. The changes of nominal tariff
rates over time can be divided into three components:
- the tariff reductions between the EEC member countries which started
in 1959 (or were continued for goods of the coal and steel indus-
tries) and had been finished largely in 1964 and completely in 1968;
- the harmonisation of external tariffs which was completed in 1964;
- the reduction of Common External Tariffs on the basis of the Kennedy
Round agreements.
The average nominal tariff rate for non-EEC imports of all industrial
sectors as a whole increased significantly until 1964 and subsequently
For the sensitivity tests see U. Hiemenz and K.v. Rabenau, Effektive
Protektion - Theorie und Berechnung filr die westdeutsche Industrie
(Tubingen, 1973), pp. 139 sqq.
18)
The nominal tariff rate t. for each industry is the weighted average of
the tariff rates for the •'various goods produced in this industry. The
values of gross production were used as weights, although another weight-
ing scheme - for example value added - might be preferrable for theo-
retical reasons. But data availability again limited our efforts.
19)
Some results are marked as preliminary by putting them into brackets. The
different reasons for this will be explained in the following paragraphs.Nominal and Effective Races of Tariff Protection
 a*
b against Imports fron EEC Countries
and against Imports from non-EFX Countries for Branches of Industry, Vest Germany
16
Branch of Industry
Nominal Tariff Protection Effective Tsriff Protection
Against Imports From
EEC-Countries non-EEC-Coun tries EEC-Countries non-EEC-Countries
Mining Products
Coal Mining, Coking
Lignite and Bituminous Coal Mining
Crude Oil, Natural gas, etc.
Other Mining
Primary and Producers' Goods
Industries
Stone and Earthen Goods
Iron and Steel Production
Iron, Steel and Malleable Iron
Foundries





Chemical Products and Coal Deriva-
tives
Sawmills and Woodworking
Pulp, Papur and Paperboarc*
Production
Rubber ar.d Asbestos Goods
Investnent~Ceods Industries








Precision and Optical Goods
Clocks and Watches
Iron, Steel, Sheet and Metal Goods
ConsuT.er-Gcods Industries
.. Fine Ceramics Products
Glass and Glass Products
Manufacture of Wood Products •
Musical Instruments, Sporting
Goods,'Toys





































































































































































































On tho basis of official Ccrnian Tariff Regulations for 19^8, cabins into consideration the goods from the free:
trade of the Europea:-. Coal ar.i Steel Co™*.init\- 1953. - Cn the bnsis of the I.nput-Outpuc Matrix or the Ifo i





















Nominal Tariff Protection Effective Tariff Protection
Branch of Industry Against Ioports From
EEC-Countries non-EEC-Countries I EEC-Countries I non-EEC-Countries
Mining Products
Coal Mining, Coking
Lignite and Bituminous Coal Mining
Crude Oil, Natural gas, etc.
Other Mining
Primary and Producers' Goods
Industries
Stone and Earthen Coods
Iron and St *el Production
Iron, Steel and Malleable Iron
Foundries





Chemical Products and Coal Deriva-
tives
Sawmills and '.Woodworking
| Pulp, Paper and Paperboard
' Production
{ Rubber and Asbestos Goods
I Investment-Goods Industrie^
: Structural and Light Metal Engih-
j eering Goods
! Steel Shapi-g
i Mechanical Engineering Coods
: Manufacture of Road Vehicles
| Shipbuilding
I Manufacture of Aircraft
| Electrical Engineering Goods
j Precision and Optical Goods
i
j Clocks and Watches




Class and Glass Products
Manufacture of Wood Products
Musical Instruments, Sporting
Goods, Toys










On the basis of domestic zw*. external





































































































































































tariffs of the common tariff rotes for the year 1964. -
te for Economic Research. Munich, for ih? year 1964.Table 3: 18
Nominal and Effective Races of Tariff Protection * against Imports from non-EEC-Countries
for Branches of Industry, West Germany
Branch of Industry Nominal Tariff Protection ; Effective Tariff Protection
Mining Products
Coal Mining, Coking
Lignite and Bituminous Coal Mining
Crude Oil, Natural gas, etc.
Other Mining
Primary and Producers' Goods Industries
Stone and Earthen Goods
Iron and Steel Production
Iron, Steel and Malleable Iron Foundries




Chemical Products and Coal Derivatives .
Sawnills and Woodworking
Pulp, Paper and Paperboard Production
Rubber and Asbestos Goods
Investment-Goods Industries
Structural and Light Metal Engineering Goods
Steel Shaping
Mechanical Engineering Goods




Precision and Optical Goods
Clocks and Watches
Iron, Steel, Sheet and Metal Goods
Consumer-Goods Industries
Fine Ceramics Products
Glass and Glass Products
Manufacture of Wood Products
Musical Instruments, Sporting Goods, Toys





































































































Nominal and Effective Rates of Tariff Protection ' against Imports from non-EEC-Countries
for Branches of Industry, West Germany
I 9 7 2
Branch of Industry Nominal Tariff Protection Effective Tariff Protection i
Mining Products 0.1
Coal Mining, Coking 0.0
Lignite and Bituminous Coal Mining , 0.0
Crude Oil, Natural gas, etc. ] 0.0
Other Mining I " 1.1
Primary and Producers' Goods Industries 6.8
I
1
Stone and Earthen Goods 3.3
Iron and Steel Production ' j 4.S
Iron, Steel and Malleable Iron Foundries . i - 7.7
Drawing Plants and Cold Rolling Mills [ .7.5
I
Non-ferrous Metal Production ., 5.5
Non-ferrous Metal Foundries 8.6
Mineral Oil Processing 3.8
Chemical Products and Coal Derivatives 11.2
Sawmills and Woodworking - 6.1
Pulp, Paper and Paperboard Production 9.4
Rubber and Asbestos Goods 7.7
Investment-Goods Industries . 6.9
Structural and Light Metal Engineering Goods 4.0
Steel Shaping 7.7
Mechanical Engineering Goods - 6.2
Manufacture of Road Venicles 8.6 -
Shipbuilding 0.4
Manufacture of Aircraft • 3.2
Electrical Engineering Goods 7.2
Precision and Optical Goods . . S.4
Clocks and Watches 7.3
Iron, Steel, Sheet and Metal Goods 7.2
Consumer-Goods Industries • 10.4
Fine Ceramics Products 9.4
Class and Glass Products . 9.5
Manufacture of Wood Products . . „_ _ 8.0 _ ...
Musical Instruments, Sporting Goods, Toys : 9.3
Paper and Paperboard Products • 13.2
Printing and Reproduction . 6.1
Plastic Products 14.3
Leather (Production, Tanning) 6.7
Leather Goods - 8.5
Shoes . ' 7.3
Textiles . . 10.3
Clothing 14.0
Total Industry 7.3
a0n the basis of the common tariff rates for the year 1972. - On the basis of














































was reduced to 8.8 per cent in 1970, that is, to about the level of
1958. In 1972 the average tariff rate was 7.3 per cent.
16. The internal nominal tariff rate for industry as a whole decreased
from 9 per cent to 1.4 per cent between 1958 and 1964 (Tables 1 and 2),
resulting in a simultaneously diminishing effective rate from 10.4 per
cent to 1.9 per cent. On the other hand, West Germany had to increase
her nominal external tariff rates by 2 per cent on an average to
achieve the average level of external tariffs of the member countries.
Thus the effective tariff rate rose by 3 percentage points. This
increase has been more than offset by the tariff reductions agreed
upon in the Kennedy Round. Compared to the situation prior to the
establishment of the EEC, the average level of West German tariffs
against non-member countries was lower in 1972 (7.3 per cent against
9 per cent). Therefore, today there is no evidence of a discrimina-
tion towards non-EEC countries, which temporarily existed, as far as
tariffs are concerned.
17. The tariff changes following the European economic integration and the
Kennedy Round had only little influence on the structural pattern of
nominal and effective tariff rates. As rank correlations between the
different tariff vectors shown in Tables 1-4 prove, the hierarchy of
tariff rates changed slightly from 1958 to 1964, but hardly changed
after 1964. This means that the external tariffs were increased in a
nP.n-linear manner followed by a linear reduction in the Kennedy Round.21










Rates for Branches of Industry























All coefficients are significant at the 0.1 per cent level.
i8. One of the most important results of our calculations stems from the
evidence that in all years under observation the effective tariff pro-
tection exceeded nominal tariffs by about one-third, on an average.
This escalation effect appears because the import of raw materials and
intermediate inputs such as energy, iron, transportation, services,
crude steel, mineral oil, non-ferrous metals, wood and leather are
either duty-free or have a lower tariff rate than the final products.
Such a cascading tariff schedule results in a higher effective tariff
protection compared to the nominal rates. Since most national tariff
systems provide final manufactured products with higher tariffs than
raw materials and intermediate inputs, escalation effects should be
the rule. A number of empirical studies for different countries have22
20)
confirmed this assessment. Separate calculations by B. Balassa and
21)
G. Basevi in the Sixties show that the manufacturing sectors (ISIC
classification Nr. 20-39) of the most important developed countries
are - with few exceptions - more heavily protected in terms of effec-
tive tariffs than in terms of nominal tariffs. Similar results appear
22)
in more recent studies which have been carried out for the OECD and
23)
the IBRD on the protective systems of selected developing coun-
tries.
19. According to our analysis the escalation effect has proved to be espec-
ially strong in the primary and producers' goods industries and in the
consumers' goods industries. For the former, the effective tariff
rates were about double nominal rates; effective tariff protection of
the latter amounted to 150 per cent of nominal protection. In addition
these two groups of industries also enjoyed in absolute terms an effec-
tive protection above the average. In those branches, however, whose
nominal tariffs on final products are lower than the tariffs on inputs
the effective rates are below the nominal rates and may even become
20)
B. Balassa, "Tariff Protection in Industrial Countries: An Evalua-
tion", Journal of Political Economy, 1965 (Vol. 73), pp. 573 sqq.
21)
'G. Basevi, "The U.S. Tariff Structure: Estimate of Effective Rates
of Protection of U.S. Industries and Industrial Labour', The Review
of Economics and Statistics, 1966 (Vol. 48), pp. 147 sqq.
22)
'I. Little, T. Scitovsky, M. Scott, Industry and Trade in Some Devel-
oping Countries: A Comparative Study (London, New York* Toronto,
1971).
23)
B. Balassa et al., The Structure of Protection in Developing Coun-
tries (Baltimore/Md., London, 1971).23
negative. This de-escalation effect can be observed in the case of the
investment goods industries whose average effective tariff is about
one-third lower than the nominal rate in all years under observation.
24) 20. Graph 1 shows - for 1970 - how escalation and de-escalation effects
are distributed among the different groups of industries and how
important they are. Taking into consideration the respective volume
of turnover, the most important branches with a de-escalation effect
are mechanical engineering goods, manufacture of road vehicles, and
electrical engineering goods. All these commodity groups are marked
by a high export intensity. Taken together, all groups with observed
25)
de-escalation effects produce more than half of West German exports.
This leads to the conclusion that, especially for internationally
highly competitive branches, the tariff scheme turns out to be less
protective than estimated from the nominal tariff rates. An addi-
tional very export-intensive industry, chemical products, indeed shows
an escalation effect, but this effect is lower than the average of all
industries. In the field of escalation effects, those branches are
dominating which suffer from heavy import competition: iron and steel
production, non-ferrous metal production, textiles and clothing, pulp,
24)
The interpretation of the results mainly refers to 1970, because
it was impossible to calculate effective rates of protection for
1972; therefore, 1970 is the most recent year for a comparison
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paper and paperboard production. In these cases nominal tariffs
veil the effective protection which is granted these raw material in-
tensive branches.
21. The above mentioned branches of industry with an escalation effect
also show high effective tariff rates in absolute terms, whereas de-
escalation effects in general are associated with effective rates
below the average. With respect to the tariff protection, it can be
stated therefore that heavily protected branches produce mainly for
domestic markets, while industries with low effective tariff rates are
export orientated in general (Graph 2 and Table 6). Accordingly there
is evidence that the current tariff schedule maintains significant trade
barriers in favour of less competitive industries but provides little
protection to export industries which in fact do not need help against
competitors.
22. At first glance it may be surprising that effective tariff rates for
shipbuilding and - partly - for manufacture of aircraft turned out to
be negative. Also there seems to be little protection for, or even
discrimination against, mining activities, in nominal as well as in
effective terms. The relevance of these rates, however, is very
26)
In 1970 the respective import quotas were 20.1, 55.1, 24.7 and 38.9
per cent, while the average import quota was 18.3 per cent. See
Table 6.Graph 2 26
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limited as far as actual protection is concerned, because those indus-
27)
tries are heavily subsidized by special tariff exemptions which we
could not include in our calculations for computational reasons.
27)
The negative effective tariff rates for shipbuilding do not indicate
a discrimination against this industry. Indeed German producers of
inputs for shipbuilding are granted higher nominal tariffs than
those for shipbuilding, but simultaneously all inputs for warships,
sea-going vessels and tugboats are imported duty-free according to
§ 27 "Deutsches Zollgesetz" and to the special regulations of the
Common Tariff. The effective tariff protection for this section of
shipbuilding, which is by far the largest with respect to turn-
over, can be estimated at zero, because in all years under observa-
tion tariffs on final goods as well as on inputs did not exist or
were not efficient. The production of other vessels, especially in-
land vessels, had a nominal protection ranging from 4.2 to 7.4 per
cent in 1970. As it can be assumed that this matches the tariff
burden on inputs, the effective tariffs for such ships range from 4
to 7 per cent also. But it has to be stressed that the competitive-
ness of West German shipbuilding is mainly guaranteed by a compre-
hensive system of subsidies.
The effective tariff rates of aircraft manufacturing are also es-
timated too low because since 1960 the tariff rates on inputs were
mostly out of operation (Protokoll der Mitgliedsstaaten der Euro-
paischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, Nr. XVII, Bundesgesetzblatt,
Teil II, Jg. 1961, p. 350; remarks to tariff number 8803 of the
Deutscher Zolltariff 1962 and of the Common Tariff from December 8>
1969; further appendix I to the Common Tariff from December 17,
1970). Regarding the relatively small share of value added in the
volume of production (30 per cent), one may conclude that the
effective tariff rates are much higher than the nominal rates and
not lower, as calculated for 1964, 1970 and 1972.
Concerning pit coal mining, zero tariffs on coal were chosen for
1970 and 1972, although the Common Tariff schedule shows positive
nominal rates for those years. These nominal tariffs are actually
inefficient because pit coal was traded within the limits of duty-
free quotas only. Thus our computation of effective tariff rates
was correct, but the reader has to keep in mind that the total pro-
tection of pit coal mining is of course influenced by the above im-
port quotas and by substantial government support (Section VI and
Table 8).
28)
We had to attach a single tariff rate to each input and were not
able to take into consideration different rates on a single input.Me 6 :
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deluding Berlin (West) and Saarland. - Excluding value added tax.
tee: Statistisches Bundesamt, Statistisches Jahrbuch fiir die Bundesrcpublik Deutschland, l.fd. Jgg. Fachserie G, Reihe 7,
AuBenhandel nach Landern ur.d Warengruppen und -zweigen des Warenverzeichnisses fur die Industriestatistik, lfd. Jgg.
Statistisches Jahrbuch Berlin, 1959, and personal calculations.-Sle 7 :
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«. Statistisches Bundesamt, Statistisches Jahrbuch fiir die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Ifd. Jgg.30
Furthermore the protection of shipbuilding and pit coal mining mainly con-
sists of nontariff trade barriers whose impact will be analysed in Sec-
tion VI. The unexpected reduction of effective tariff protection for the
extraction of oil from 27.8 per cent in 1958 to -13.9 per cent in 1964 is
mainly caused by the complete cutback of tariffs on crude oil. The nega-
tive sign of effective tariff rates in 1964, 1970 and 1972 is brought
about by the fact that nominal tariffs on inputs exceeded the protection
of final goods, which was close to zero in all years in question.
V. TARIFF PREFERENCES FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
23. The results for 1972 have to be modified in one respect: starting from
June 1, 1971, effective tariff rates have been valid against most devel-
29) oping countries only beyond a certain volume of imports. Since that
time non-reciprocal tariff preferences are granted to most developing
30) 31)
countries by the EEC. The volume of duty-free trade was determined
by the volume of EEC imports from the favoured countries in 1968 plus 5
per cent of the volume of EEC imports from all other countries. This im-
port quota will be adjusted each year according to the above 5 per cent
rule, the basic volume remaining unchanged.
29)
A minor qualification has to be added concerning the effective rates
for 1964 and 1970. In 1963, the EEC agreed with 18 African asso-
ciates to a complete reciprocal tariff reduction for all trade (Jaunde-
Convention). But the trade volume between the EEC and those coun-
tries is rather insignificant, since most of them are listed among
the poorest countries of the world (as measured by per capita income).
Up to now the agreement is applied to 91 independent countries and
47 dependent regions, but not to Greece, Malta, Portugal, Spain,
Turkey (the OECD member countries), Israel, Cuba and Taiwan.
See Amtsblatt der Europaischen Gemeinschaften, 14. Jg. Nr. L 142,
June 28, 1971.31
24. In principle this regulation is applied to all products of manufac-
turing industry. But there are significant qualifications:
- Concerning manufactured agricultural products, only ten tariff items
are included, and only those with low nominal tariff rates; further
140 items are granted only a small tariff reduction.
- The volume of duty-free imports is not equally determined for all
manufactured products; no adjustments are planned, for example, for
cotton textiles and mineral oil products.
- The imports of so-called "quasi-sensitive" and "sensitive" manu-
factured products are currently controlled and each EEC member coun-
try is allowed to cancel the preferences for these goods at any
time. Furthermore the determined volume of imports of sensitive
goods from favoured countries, which amounts to 54 per cent of all
EEC imports from those countries, is distributed among the member
32)
countries according to a confirmed scheme.
- An important exception is made regarding the imports of textiles.
Only member countries of the "International Agreement on Cotton and
Textiles" (India, Jamaica, Colombia, Mexico, South Korea and Egypt)
are favoured without restrictions.
- Each favoured developing country must not utilise more than 50 per
cent of each product's duty-free quota. For quasi-sensitive and sen-
sitive products, the country's share is even smaller for some items.
25. Summarizing, it can be stated: the preference scheme is broad-mindedly
constructed for items in which developing countries cannot at all, or
32)
The distribution is not at all identical with the former pattern of
exports from the developing countries to the EEC.32
not yet, compete. For commodity groups, however, in which developing
countries possess competitive export industries, preferences are
especially scarce. Hopefully, tariff reductions will be extended for
these items. But for the time being the predictive quality of the com-
puted nominal and effective tariff rates is hardly affected because of
the mentioned discrepancy between the preferences and the supply capaci-
ty and because of the small volumes of duty-free import quotas. The
tariff protection of West German industry is not lessened by the preferences.
VI. THE TOTAL PROTECTION OF WEST GERMAN INDUSTRY
2'6. Effective rates of protection are superior to other measures of pro-
tection because they allow one to standardise the protective effects
of totally different trade regulations and to express them in one com-
prehensive figure. In the case of West Germany the most important
33)
nontariff trade barriers ' which may cause a distortion of the struc-
tural pattern of industry are import quotas, subsidies and taxes. The
consideration of nontariff distortions of international trade in the
calculation of effective rates of protection necessitates first of all
two basic changes in the general concept:
- calculations are based on net value added, that is, value added plus
subsidies and minus indirect taxes.
- all coefficients have to be calculated in relation to the value of
gross production plus subsidies.
33)
For a general survey of nontariff trade regulations see R.E. Baldwin,
Nontariff Distortions of International Trade (Washington D.C., 1970).33
This leads to the following new basic formula:
1 - A! - T'.
in
d - Z a'..
J J j
 XJ
Ej —T. ATH ~ sr
j X
where T! represents the percentage of indirect taxes in gross pro-
duction. The primes symbolise the altered basis of the computation.
27. In generals import quotas lead to a reduction of import supply and
34) therefore to a discrepancy between domestic and world market prices.
This difference in prices (computed as percentage of world market
price) is called the tariff-equivalent of an import quota or simply
the implicit tariff. In computing effective rates of protection this
implicit tariff can be handled the same way as a nominal tariff to cal-
culate the free trade value added. In West Germany the international
trade law ("AuSenwirtschaftsgesetz") and its amendments reveal which
commodities can be imported freely and which cannot. A detailed analy-
35)
sis of these regulations - carried out by Glisman and Neu - shows
significant quotas only for various items of pit coal mining, textiles
and clothing. But although Glisman and Neu estimated implicit tariffs
for all items in question, we were able to include in our calculations
only the tariff equivalents of pit coal and pit coal products for
imports from non-member countries. These amounted to 24.7 per cent in
For a detailed analysis of this mechanism see H.H. Glisman and A.
Neu, "Towards New Agreements on International Trade Liberalization
Methods and Examples of Measuring Nontariff Trade Barriers", Welt-
wirtschaftliches Archiv, 1971 (Vol. 107), pp. 235 sqq. - Hiemenz
and v. Rabenau, op. cit., pp. 112 sqq.
Glisman and Neu, op. cit., pp. 241 sqq.34
1964 and 39.4 per cent in 1968 and were used instead of the nominal
tariffs on pit coal, coke and briquets to compute the effective rates
of total protection for 1964 and 1970.
'28. Besides tariffs and quotas, subsidies and taxes may result in trade
barriers if they favour or discriminate against only a few and not all
industries. Relevant in this context are subsidies to special
branches, exemptions from the general tax rule and a differing taxa-
tion of imports, exports and domestic consumption. Subsidies as well
as tariffs cause an increase of domestic value added, leaving consum-
ers' prices, however - contrary to the case of tariffs - unchanged.
Therefore the free trade value added of favoured products has to be
adjusted for the subsidies while no adjustment is needed on the side
of the industries consuming subsidised goods. Indirect taxes influence
the competitiveness of domestic suppliers only in so far as interna-
tionally traded goods are taxed differently from domestic consumption.
If, for example, a turnover tax is levied only on domestically produced
goods - as in 1958 on crude oil - this tax diminishes the domestic
producer price because domestic suppliers have to adjust their prices
to import prices. Such a discrimination against domestic activities
has to be ruled out when calculating free trade value added.
36)
This criterion arises because the possible trade effect of a general
subsidy or tax will be nullified by a subsequent exchange rate ad-
justment which will be necessary to preserve a balance of payments
equilibrium. Consequently direct taxes, general subsidies and re-
gional development programs need not be considered since they favour
single industries at most by chance. But this argument is contro-
versial. For a different opinion see H.G. Grubel and H.G. Johnson,
''Nominal Tariffs, Indirect Taxes and Effective Rates of Protection:
The Common Market Countries 1959", The Economic Journal, 1967 (Vol.
77), pp. 761 sqq.
37)See Table 9.35
29. Considering producers' subsidies and discriminations the basic formula
has to be altered in the following way. An abolition of direct finan-
cial support diminishes the receipts of the industries in question and
thus value added, given constant input prices. The share of financial
support granted to an industry in the value of gross production (s.)
can be handled like a tariff to reduce free trade turnover. On the
other hand free trade turnover has to be increased if competing imports
enjoyed tax reductions in the protection situation. An equal taxation
of imports and domestically produced goods in the free trade situation
leads to an increase of domestic producers' prices by the amount of
the previous tax reduction (u.). This leads to:
1 - A! - x!
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30. Consumers of manufactured products may be subsidised or discriminated
against by similar means as well. Thus consumers of inputs are
favoured when exemptions from the general turnover tax reduce the
prices of these inputs. By the same token subsidies to consumers can
diminish input prices without changing the supply prices. In both
cases a protection effect arises because the value added of the con-
sumers is increased; therefore the respective free trade input coef-
ficients have to be adjusted. A discrimination of consumers results from
consumption taxes on special products - the heating oil tax for
38} example - which are levied to lessen the competitiveness of these
38* See Table 9.36
products as against substitutes. Such taxes would be eliminated in a
free trade situation.
Concerning the formula the different cases have to be distinguished.
An abolition of turnover tax preferences increases the consumer price
of the products in question by the tax rate (u.)$ which then has to be
paid. The same effect is caused by an abolition of tax reductions for
imports, that is, free trade prices of these imports and of the compet-
ing domestic products go up by the amount of the former tax reduction
(v.). On the other hand, if the heating oil tax is eliminated, the
price of heating oil declines ceteris paribus and thereby increases
the consumers' value added. The inputs of heating oil become less ex-
pensive according to the tax rate of heating oil (h.)- The effective
rate of total protection can be calculated as:
1 - A! - x!
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Considering the non-traded input as in the calculation of effective
tariff rates, our final formula for total effective protection emerges:37
Formula For Calculating Effective Protection
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• Symbols
E. Effective tariff rate of industry j
A
1. Depreciation coefficient of industry j '
T . Fraction of indirect taxes on the value of gross production of industry j
Y . Fraction of the investment-good x of the total investment of industry j
a
1.. Input coefficient of traded inputs i, which are used in industry j
a' . Input coefficient of non-traded inputs k, which are used in industry j -
6 Input coefficient of the primary factors r necessarv to Droduce the non-traded inputs k
a.. Input coefficient of traded inputs i necessary to produce the non-traded inputs k
o Input coefficient of non-traded inputs m necessary to produce the non-traded inputs k
8 Input coefficient of the primary factors r necessary to produce the non-traded inputs m
a. . Input coefficient of traded inputs i necessary to produce the non-traded inputs ra
a Input coefficient of non-traded inputs w necessary to produce the non-traded inputs m
d. Domestic turnover of industry j as fraction of j's total turnover
t. Nominal rate of tariff protection of industry j
s .
J
Tariff rate of investment-good x
t: Tariff rate of traded inputs i used in the production of good j
Fraction of direct financial support of the value of gross production of industry j
difference between domestic turnover tax burden and respective tax on imports in percent of value of gross production
(including subsidies)
u. Turnover tax exemptions of a few product groups in percent of prices
v. Difference between domestic turnover tax burden and respective tax on imports of the products under consideration
in percent of prices
i • Tax rate for heating oil
The apostrophe means that the coefficients have been computed on the basis of value of gross production including
subsidies subsidies38
32. To include subsidies and tariffs in our calculations we carried out a
39)
detailed analysis of current and previous state regulations.
Although we compiled a rather comprehensive survey, for different rea-
sons only a smaller part of the regulations fitting into our criterion
could be applied to our computation. The main reason was that the
volume of subsidies or tax savings had to be quantified as a percentage
of gross production. This was possible only in cases of direct finan-
cial support and exemptions from indirect taxes. Tables 8 and 9 show
the absolute values of the included regulations for the years under
consideration and the tariff equivalents (s.) of the subsidies which
represent the share of subsidies in the volume of gross production.
According to Table 8 the calculation of effective protection was ex-
tended with respect to financial support to mining, extraction of
crude oil and natural gas, shipbuilding, manufacture of aircraft and
the production of electrical engineering goods. The highest subsidy
in terms of tariff equivalent was granted to the manufacture of air-
craft (13 per cent in 1970). The estimation of advantages and discri-
minations concerning consumers was less difficult. Table 9 shows that
mainly consumers of mining products, iron and steel and crude oil and
oil products enjoyed tax exemptions. The tax on heating oil, however,
was levied in order to subsidise adjustment processes in pit coal min-
ing to changing conditions of the energy market and has to be con-
sidered as discrimination against heating oil consumers.
39)
The results are published in Hiemenz and v. Rabenau, op. cit., pp.
177 sqq.Table 8: Financial Support by the Federal Government and the Laender for the Manufacturing Industry - West Germany
(bnly as far as Included in the Calculations of Effective Rates of Protection) 39
Subsidies to the shipbuilding industry (0902/66203; 6004/68302)
Branch of Industry, Description of Financial Support
PIT-COAL MINING
Support to promote rati-nalization in pit-coal mining (0902/68310)
Subsidies to investment (0902/89206) •.
Subsidies to stabilize the sale of coke to the iron and steel industries (0902/68326)
Federal Support to the miners' pension funds reducing the entrepreneurs' share
(1113/650; 6004/68302) ...
Subsidies to the miners' health insurance (1113/603)
LIGNITE MINING ....
Subsidies to the miners' health insurance (1113/603)
OTHER MINING
Federal support to the miners' pension funds reducing the entrepreneurs' share
(1113/650; 6004/68302) .
Subsidies to the miners' health insurance (1113/603)
Subsidy to the non-ferrous metal mining
:industry and support for excavating









































CRUDE OIL, NATURAL CAS
Subsidies to German crude oil producers
MINERAL OIL PROCESSING
Temporary support for the production of
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(0902/68302)






























ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING GOODS • . •
Support to the technical development of computers (0902/89231)





























table 9 : Tax Exemptions for the Manufacturing Industry - West Germany
(only as far as Included in the Calculations of Effective Rates of Protection)
Description of Tax Exemptions
Exemption from turnover tax for solid combustibles in wholesale trade
(§ 4 Ziff. 4 UStG, Freiliste 3 Nr. 2)
a
Exemption from turnover tax for smelting materials and smelting products for
producers and wholesale traders - "Verhiittungsprivileg" - (§ 4 Ziff. 26
UStG, i.V.m. § 4 Ziff. 4 Freiliste 3 Nr. 9a, c und 12)
Exemption from turnover tax for crude oil in wholesale trade
(§ 4 Ziff. 4 UStG, Freiliste 3 Nr. 4)
Exemption from mineral oil tax for mineral oils used in oil processing
(§ 3 MinoStG)
Exemption from turnover tax for gasoline, lubricants, liquid heating materials
made from oil, coal, etc. for producers and wholesale trade - "Mineralb'l-
privileg" - (5 4 Ziff. 4 UStG, Freiliste 3 Nr. 5;§4b UStG)
€ -Wholesale Trade:
; ~ Producers:
Exemption from turnover tax for iron and steel in wholesale trade
(§ 4 Ziff. 4 UStG, Freiliste 3 Nr. 9b)
Exemption from turnover tax for cotton in wholesale trade
(§ 4 Ziff. 4 UStG, i.V.m. Freiliste 3 Nr. 1)




































(§ 4 Ziff. 4 UStG, i.V.m. Freiliste 3 Nr. 1) Uj 0.010 0.010
Exemption from turnover tax equivalent for imports of crude oil ,
(Freiliste 1 Anlage 2 der Ausgleichsteuerordnung) u. = v. 0.040
Specific tax on heating oil (§ 8 Abs. 8 MinSStG); which in turn is uBid to
subsidize adjustment processes in pit~coal mining to the changing conditions of
the energy market (Artikel 4, Gesetz zur Anderung des MinoStG, vom 26.4.1960)
- Light Heating Oil: hi . 0.105 0.097 {
- Heavy Heating Oil: hi 0.409 0.4155 i
Respective paragraphs of federal laws and special amendments - For the explanation of symbols see paragraph 36.. :
turce: Federal budget and budgets of the Laender, die Finanzberichte des Bundesministeriums der Finanzen, die Bundestagsdruck-
sachen III/1229, July 28, 1959, V/2423, December 21, 1967, and Vl/391, February 16, 1970, der Bundeshaushalt nach Sachgebieten,
Erganzter Sonderdruck aus den Finanzberichten (der entsprechenden Jahrgange) des Bundesministeriums der Finanzen, Zavlaris,
D. : Die Subventionen in der BRD seit 1951, Deutsches Institut fiir Wirtschaftsforschung, Beitrage zur Strukturforschung, Heft
14, Berlin 1970, Personal calculation.41
33^ Thus the final computation of effective rates of total protection
includes, besides tariffs, import quotas for pit coal mining, direct
financial support, exemptions from turnover tax and the mineral oil
tax as a discriminating consumer tax. The results are shown in Table
10. First of all it is striking that effective rates of protection
generally exceed effective tariff rates. This results mainly from a
change in the method of computation and not from the inclusion of
additional protective measures. The consideration of taxes and sub-
sidies in this final computation allowed for an exclusion of indirect
taxes from value added. In this way the basis of the calculations is
diminished, resulting in a higher rate of effective protection even
for those branches which are granted only tariff protection. The
average increase amounts to one-third of effective tariff rates. The
average escalation effect went up from the previous 33 per cent to
more than 100 per cent above nominal tariff rates.
34. A comparison between effective rates of total protection and effective
tariff rates reveals the following peculiarities;
- Effective rates of total protection as well as effective tariffs
reflect the harmonisation of tariffs within the EEC and the GATT.
The average rate of total protection towards non-member countries
first increased from 14.9 per cent in 1958 to 22.1 per cent in 1964
and subsequently declined to 19.3 per cent in 1970. Other than the
tariff rate, the total protection for 1970 was not cut back to the
1958 level. In 1970 the effective rate for industry as a whole was-Table 10:
Effective Protection
 a of the Branches of Industry, West Germany
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4.4 per cent higher than in 1958. On the other hand the total pro-
tection against member countries continuously declined since 1958
as tariff protection declined.
- The consideration of nontariff trade barriers does not alter the
structure of protection significantly. Primary and producers' goods
industries as well as consumers' goods industries still enjoy higher
protection on an average than investment goods industries. But coal
mining, being scarcely protected by tariffs, turns out to be the
most highly protected branch.
- The rates of total protection show, in addition, that certain
branches of industry are granted more nontariff than tariff protec-
tion. This is especially true for pit coal mining (import quotas
and financial support), iron and steel production, non-ferrous metal
production and foundries as well as mineral oil processing (tax
exemptions).
35- The main reason that the rate of total protection for 1970 did not
decline to the 1958 level is the protection of mining in recent years.
For the other sections of industry no important differences in regard
to tariff protection can be observed as far as the structure and the
intertemporal changes in total protection are concerned. Yet it may
be noted that the rate against non-member countries for primary and
producers' goods declined more rapidly than the average rate;did be-
tween 1964 and 1970. This is mainly based on the fact that all tax
exemptions were no longer effective subsequent to the establishment of44
the value added tax in 1968. Since iron, steel and non-ferrous metal
production and processing were especially affected by this measure in
1970, their effective rates of protection were cut back to half of the
1964 values.
36". Although the trade within EEC countries was also affected by nontariff
distortions (3.4 per cent total protection against a tariff rate of 1.9
per cent in 1964), the total protection against EEC competitors is neg-
ligible in general. The only exceptions are the primary and producers'
goods industries which in 1964 still enjoyed large tax exemptions.
Since these measures were abolished and since even in 1964 total pro-
tection was lows no effective rates of total protection have been cal-
culated for 1970.
37. As available data and our computations reveal, pit coal mining is one
of the most heavily protected branches of industry in West Germany in
terms of the effective rate as well as of the variety of protective
devices. Starting from 1958 when pit coal mining was hardly protected
against imports from non-member countries, import quotas led to an ever
increasing gap between domestic and world market prices. This gap
amounted to 24.7 per cent in 1964 and even widened to 39.4 per cent in
40)
1970. Besides import quotas pit coal mining was supported by exemp-
tions from turnover tax (for solid combustibles) and by annually
increasing financial subsidies (300 million DM in 1970). Thus the
effective rate of total protection grew from 0.5 per cent in 1958 to
40)
See paragraph 22.45
65.2 in 1964 and 128.3 in 1970 (Table 10). Nevertheless these results
do not describe the actual protection, because - as mentioned above -
a certain number of additional subsidies could not be included for
methodological reasons. Among these are:
- financial support to the iron and steel producers to subsidise con-
sumption of pit coal and coke ("Kokskohlenbeihilfe")
- financial support and tax exemptions in order to promote sales of
coal instead of other energy (that is, transportation subsidies or
investment subsidies for the construction of power stations operating
with coal)
- subsidies for rationalisations and close-downs
- state loan guarantees for pit coal mining amounting to 3.966 million
DM up to 1970
- high taxes on mineral oil favouring pit coal consumption.
38- For shipbuilding the same is true regarding the effective rate of
total protection as had been mentioned concerning the tariff rate:
the computed rate does not reflect total protection. This comes about
partly because tariff exemptions were not considered, and partly
because some important subsidies, for example, sales promoting
measures and investment support, could not be included in our calcula-
tions. West German shipping companies are granted a 10 per cent reduc-
tion of prices for any order to German shipbuilders, a reduction of
interest on loans to finance orders and substantial depreciation
facilities. Furthermore, capital investment in shipbuilding may be46
depreciated over a shorter than normal time period and the deprecia-
tion may exceed 100 per cent. Concerning these subsidies, it must be
concluded that shipbuilding is not at all a discriminated branch of
industry.
39. The effective rate of total protection for manufacture of aircraft is
also too low compared to the actual situation, although it amounted to
73.2 per cent in 1970. We disregarded the tariff exemptions of the
41) Common Tariff for certain inputs. Also, we could not take into
consideration some project-oriented subsidies (for example the Airbus
project), because neither the favoured companies nor the time schedule
of the support could be determined correctly.
40. The remarkably high effective rates for mineral oil processing (60.5
per cent in 1964 and 168.4 per cent in 1970) result from the considera-
tion of indirect taxes. The computed rates reflect the large share of
indirect taxes in total value added (43 per cent in 1964) rather than
tax preferences. The denominator of our formula, that is the actual
income of labour and capital (excluding indirect taxes), amounts to
only 8.7 per cent of the value of gross production. This extremely
small value added is affected significantly by tariffs and subsidies,
for instance, tax exemptions for oil used in oil processing (Table 9),
and thus leads to high effective rates even on the basis of a minor
nominal tariff or nontariff protection.
41)
See Common Tariff, op. cit., Appendix A.47
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
41. Leaving aside the details, our calculations give evidence that pro-
tection of West German industry is much higher than judged from
nominal tariff rates. The most important means of protection are, with-
out any doubt, tariffs, while nontariff trade barriers favour only a
few selected branches and do not have a more general impact. High
protection in absolute and relative terms is granted to those branches
which suffer from heavy import competition. Specifically, raw ma-
terial and/or labour intensive industries benefit most from the dis-
crimination against foreign suppliers. Although this structure of
protection is an outcome of historical development rather than of an
intended economic policy, it reveals an important argument for the
current discussions concerning the international division of labour.
The structure of West German protection - and the same is true for
most industrialised countries - mainly reduces the access of developing
nations to her markets because these nations are typically the main
competitors regarding raw material and labour intensive products.
Therefore, if developing nations are to be granted a better chance
for export-orientated growth, international trade agreements should
consist of specific rather than of linear tariff reductions. Thus
an integration of developing nations into the international division
of labour and, by the same token, a structural adjustment process
within the industrialised nations will be enhanced, which may help
both parties to be better off in the future.